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Abstract
An -distance-uniform graph is one in which from every vertex, all but an -fraction of the
remaining vertices are at some fixed distance d, called the critical distance. We consider the
maximum possible value of d in an -distance-uniform graph with n vertices. We show that for
1
n ≤  ≤ 1logn , there exist -distance-uniform graphs with critical distance 2
Ω( logn
log −1 ), disproving
a conjecture of Alon et al. that d can be at most logarithmic in n. We also show that our
construction is best possible, in the sense that an upper bound on d of the form 2
O( logn
log −1 ) holds
for all  and n.
1 Introduction
We say that an n-vertex graph is -distance-uniform for some parameter  > 0 if there is a value d,
called the critical distance, such that, for every vertex v, all but at most n of the other vertices are
at distance exactly d from v. Distance-uniform graphs exist for some, but not all, possible triplets
(n, , d); a trivial example is the complete graph Kn, which is distance-uniform with  =
1
n and
d = 1. So it is natural to try to characterize which triplets (n, , d) are realizable as distance-uniform
graphs.
The notion of distance uniformity is introduced by Alon, Demaine, Hajiaghayi, and Leighton in
[1], motivated by the analysis of network creation games. It turns out that equilibria in a certain
network creation game can be used to construct distance-uniform graphs. As a result, understanding
distance-uniform graphs tells us which equilibria are possible.
1.1 From network creation games to distance uniformity
The use of the Internet has been growing significantly in the last few decades. This fact has
motivated theoretical studies that try to capture properties of Internet-like networks into models.
Fabrikant et al. [9] proposed one of these first models, the so called sum classic network creation
game (or abbreviated sum classic) from which variations (like [4], [8]) and extensions of it (like [3],
[6]) have been considered in the subsequent years.
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Although all these models try to capture different aspects of Internet, all of them can be identified
as strategic games: every agent or node (every player in the game) buys some links (every player
picks an strategy) in order to be connected in the network formed by all the players (the strategic
configurations formed as a combination of the strategies of every player) and tries to minimize a
cost function modeling their needs and interests.
All these models together with their results constitute a whole subject inside game theory and
computer science that stands on its own: the field of network creation games. Some of the most
relevant concepts discussed in network creation games are optimal network, Nash equilibria and the
price of anarchy, among others.
An optimal network is the outcome of a configuration having minimum overall cost, that is, the sum
of the costs of every player has the minimum possible value. A Nash equilibrium is a configuration
where each player cannot strictly decrease his cost function given that the strategies of the other
players are fixed. The price of anarchy quantifies the loss in terms of efficiency between the worst
Nash equilibrium (anyone having maximum overall cost) and any optimal network (anyone having
minimal overall cost).
The sum classic is specified with a set of players N = {1, ..., n} and a parameter α > 0 representing
the cost of establishing a link. Every player i ∈ N wishes to be connected in the resulting network,
then the strategy si ∈ P(N \{i}) represents the subset of players to which i establishes links. Then
considering the tuple of the strategies for every player s = (s1, ..., sn) (called a strategy profile) the
communication network associated to s, noted as G[s], is defined as the undirected graph having N
as the set of vertices and the edges (i, j) iff i ∈ sj or j ∈ si. The communication network represents
the resulting network obtained after considering the links bought for every node. Then the cost
function for a strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sn) has two components: the link cost and the usage cost.
The link cost for a player i ∈ N is α|si| and it quantifies the cost of buying |si| links. In contrast,
the usage cost for a player i is
∑
j 6=i dG[s](i, j). Therefore, the total cost incurred for player i is
ci(s) = α|si|+
∑
j 6=i dG[s](i, j).
On the other hand, a given undirected graph G in the sum basic network creation game (or abbre-
viated sum basic) is said to be in equilibrium iff, for every edge (i, j) ∈ E(G) and every other player
k, the player i does not strictly decrease the sum of distances to the other players by swapping the
edge (i, j) for the edge (i, k).
At first glance, the sum basic could be seen as the model obtained from the sum classic when
considering only deviations that consists in swapping individual edges. However, in any Nash
equilibrium for the sum classic, only one of the endpoints of any edge has bought that specific edge
so that just one of the endpoints of the edge can perform a swap of that specific edge. Therefore,
one must be careful when trying to translate a property or result from the sum basic to the sum
classic.
In the sum classic game it has been conjectured that the price of anarchy is constant (asymptot-
ically) for any value of α. Until now this conjecture has been proved true for α = O(n1−) with
 ≥ 1/ log n ([7]) and for α > 9n ([2]). In [7] it is proved that the price of anarchy is upper bounded
by the diameter of any Nash equilibrium. This is why the diameter of equilibria in the sum basic
is studied.
In [1], the authors show that sufficiently large graph powers of an equilibrium graph in the sum
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basic model will result in distance-uniform graphs; if the critical distance is large, then the original
equilibrium graph in the sum basic model imposed a high total cost on its nodes. In particular, it
follows that if -distance-uniform graphs had diameter O(log n), the diameter of equilibria for the
sum basic would be at most O(log3 n).
1.2 Previous results on distance uniformity
This application motivates the already natural question: in an -distance-uniform graph with n
vertices and critical distance d, what is the relationship between the parameters , n, and d?
Specifically, can we derive an upper bound on d in terms of  and n? Up to a constant factor, this
is equivalent to finding an upper bound on the diameter of the graph, which must be between d
and 2d as long as  < 12 .
Random graphs provide one example of distance-uniform graphs. In [5], Bolloba´s shows that
for sufficiently large p = p(n), the diameter of the random Erdo˝s–Re´nyi random graph Gn,p is
asymptotically almost surely concentrated on one of two values. In fact, from every vertex v in
Gn,p, the breadth-first search tree expands by a factor of O(np) at every layer, reaching all or
almost all vertices after about logr n steps. Such a graph is also expected to be distance-uniform:
the biggest layer of the breadth-first search tree will be much bigger than all previous layers.
More precisely, suppose that we choose p(n) so that the average degree r = (n − 1)p satisfies two
criteria: that r  (log n)3, and that for some d, rd/n− 2 log n approaches a constant C as n→∞.
Then it follows from Lemma 3 in [5] that (with probability 1− o(1)) for every vertex v in Gn,p, the
number of vertices at each distance k < d from v is O(rk). It follows from Theorem 6 in [5] that
the number of vertex pairs in Gn,p at distance d + 1 from each other is Poisson with mean 12e−C ,
so there are only O(1) such pairs with probability 1 − o(1). As a result, such a random graph is
-distance-uniform with  = O( lognr ), and critical distance d = logr n+O(1).
This example provides a compelling image of what distance-uniform graphs look like: if the breadth-
first search tree from each vertex grows at the same constant rate, then most other vertices will be
reached in the same step. In any graph that is distance-uniform for a similar reason, the critical
distance d will be at most logarithmic in n. In fact, Alon et al. conjecture that all distance-uniform
graphs have diameter O(log n).
Alon et al. prove an upper bound of O( logn
log −1 ) in a special case: for -distance-uniform graphs with
 < 14 that are Cayley graphs of Abelian groups. In this case, if G is the Cayley graph of an Abelian
group A with respect to a generating set S, one form of Plu¨nnecke’s inequality (see, e.g., [11]) says
that the sequence
|S + S + · · ·+ S︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
|1/k
is decreasing in k. Since S, S + S, S + S + S, . . . are precisely the sets of vertices which can be
reached by 1, 2, 3, . . . steps from 0, this inequality quantifies the idea of constant-rate growth in the
breadth-first search tree; Theorem 15 in [1] makes this argument formal.
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1.3 Our results
In this paper, we disprove Alon et al.’s conjecture by constructing distance-uniform graphs that do
not share this behavior, and whose diameter is exponentially larger than these examples. We also
prove an upper bound on the critical distance (and diameter) showing our construction to be best
possible in one asymptotic sense. Specifically, we show the following two results:
Theorem 1.1. In any -distance-uniform graph with n vertices, the critical distance d satisfies
d = 2
O
(
logn
log −1
)
.
Theorem 1.2. For any  and n with 1n ≤  ≤ 1logn , there exists an -distance-uniform graph on n
vertices with critical distance
d = 2
Ω
(
logn
log −1
)
.
Note that, since a 1logn -distance-uniform graph is also
1
2 -distance-uniform, Theorem 1.2 also provides
a lower bound of d = 2
Ω( logn
log logn
)
for any  > 1logn .
Combined, these results prove that the maximum critical distance is 2
Θ( logn
log −1 ) whenever they both
apply. A small gap remains for sufficiently large : for example when  is constant as n → ∞. In
this case, Theorem 1.1 gives an upper bound on d which is polynomial in n, while the lower bound
of Theorem 1.2 grows slower than any polynomial.
The family of graphs used to prove Theorem 1.2 is interesting in its own right. We give two different
interpretations of the underlying structure of these graphs. First, we describe a combinatorial game,
generalizing the well-known Tower of Hanoi puzzle, whose transition graph is -distance-uniform
and has large diameter. Second, we give a geometric interpretation, under which each graph in
the family is the skeleton of the convex hull of an arrangement of points on a high-dimensional
sphere.
2 Upper bound
For a vertex v of a graph G, let Γr(v) denote the set {w ∈ V (G) | d(v, w) = r}: the vertices at
distance exactly r from v. In particular, Γ0(v) = {v} and Γ1(v) is the set of all vertices adjacent
to v. Let
Nr(v) =
r⋃
i=0
Γi(v)
denote the set of vertices within distance at most r from v.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 1.1, we begin with a simple argument that is effective
for an  which is very small:
Lemma 2.1. The minimum degree δ(G) of an -distance-uniform graph G satisfies δ(G) ≥ −1−1.
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Proof. Suppose that G is -distance-uniform, n is the number of vertices of G, and d is the critical
distance: for any vertex v, at least (1− )n vertices of G are at distance exactly d from v.
Let v be an arbitrary vertex of G, and fix an arbitrary breadth-first search tree T , rooted at v.
We define the score of a vertex w (relative to T ) to be the number of vertices at distance d from v
which are descendants of w in the tree T .
There are at least (1− )n vertices at distance d from v, and all of them are descendants of some
vertex in the neighborhood Γ1(v). Therefore the total score of all vertices in Γ1(v) is at least
(1− )n.
On the other hand, if w ∈ Γ1(v), each vertex counted by the score of w is at distance d− 1 from w.
Since at least (1− )n vertices are at distance d from w, at most n vertices are at distance d− 1,
and therefore the score of w is at most n.
In order for |Γ1(v)| scores of at most n to sum to at least (1 − )n, |Γ1(v)| must be at least
(1−)n
n = 
−1 − 1.
This lemma is enough to show that in a 1√
n
-distance-uniform graph, the critical distance is at most
2. Choose a vertex v: all but
√
n of the vertices of G are at the critical distance d from v, and√
n− 1 of the vertices are at distance 1 from v by Lemma 2.1. The remaining uncounted vertex is
v itself. It is impossible to have d ≥ 3, as that would leave no vertices at distance 2 from v.
For larger , the bound of Lemma 2.1 becomes ineffective, but we can improve it by a more general
argument of which Lemma 2.1 is just a special case.
Lemma 2.2. Let G be an -distance-uniform graph with critical distance d. Suppose that for some
r with 2r + 1 ≤ d, we have |Nr(v)| ≥ N for each v ∈ V (G). Then we have |N3r+1(v)| ≥ N−1 for
each v ∈ V (G).
Proof. Let v be any vertex of G, and let {w1, w2, . . . , wt} be a maximal collection of vertices in
Γ2r+1(v) such that d(wi, wj) ≥ 2r + 1 for each i 6= j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ t.
We claim that for each vertex u ∈ Γd(v)—for each vertex u at the critical distance from v—there
is some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ t such that u ∈ Nd−1(wi). To see this, consider any shortest path from v
to u, and let upi ∈ Γ2r+1(v) be the (2r + 1)th vertex along this path. (Here we use the assumption
that 2r + 1 ≤ d.) From the maximality of {w1, w2, . . . , wt}, it follows that d(wi, upi) ≤ 2r for some
i with 1 ≤ i ≤ t. But then,
d(wi, u) ≤ d(wi, upi) + d(upi, u) ≤ 2r + (d− 2r − 1) = d− 1.
So u ∈ Nd−1(wi).
To state this claim differently, the sets Nd−1(w1), . . . , Nd−1(wt) together cover Γd(v). These sets
are all small while the set they cover is large, so there must be many of them:
(1− )n ≤ |Γd(v)| ≤
t∑
i=1
|Nd−1(wi)| ≤
t∑
i=1
n = tn,
which implies that t ≥ (1−)nn = −1 − 1.
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The vertices v, w1, w2, . . . , wt are each at distance at least 2r + 1 from each other, so the sets
Nr(v), Nr(w1), . . . , Nr(wt) are disjoint.
By the hypothesis of this lemma, each of these sets has size at least N , and we have shown that
there are at least −1 sets. So their union has size at least N−1. Their union is contained in
N3r+1(v), so we have |N3r+1(v)| ≥ N−1, as desired.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.1. The strategy is to realize that the lower bounds on
|Nr(v)|, which we get from Lemma 2.2, are also lower bounds on n, the number of vertices in the
graph. By applying Lemma 2.2 iteratively for as long as we can, we can get a lower bound on n in
terms of  and d, which translates into an upper bound on d in terms of  and n.
More precisely, set r1 = 1 and rk = 3rk−1+1, a recurrence which has closed-form solution rk = 3
k−1
2 .
Lemma 2.1 tells us that in an -distance-uniform graph G with critical distance d, Nr1(v) ≥ −1.
Lemma 2.2 is the inductive step: if, for all v, Nrk(v) ≥ −k, then Nrk+1(v) ≥ −(k+1), as long as
2rk + 1 ≤ d.
The largest k for which 2rk + 1 ≤ d is k = blog3 dc. So we can inductively prove that
n ≥ Nrk+1(v) ≥ −(blog3 dc+1)
which can be rearranged to get
log n
log −1
− 1 ≥ blog3 dc.
This implies that
d ≤ 3
logn
log −1 = 2
O
(
logn
log −1
)
,
proving Theorem 1.1.
3 Lower bound
To show that this bound on d is tight, we need to construct an -distance-uniform graph with a large
critical distance d. We do this by defining a puzzle game whose state graph has this property.
3.1 The Hanoi game
We define a Hanoi state to be a finite sequence of nonnegative integers ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) such
that, for all i > 1, xi 6= xi−1. Let
Hr,k =
{
~x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k : ~x is a Hanoi state}.
For convenience, we also define a proper Hanoi state to be a Hanoi state ~x with x1 6= 0, and
H∗r,k ⊂ Hr,k to be the set of all proper Hanoi states. While everything we prove will be equally
true for Hanoi states and proper Hanoi states, it is more convenient to work with H∗r,k, because
|H∗r,k| = rk.
In the Hanoi game on Hr,k, an initial state ~a ∈ Hr,k and a final state ~b ∈ Hr,k are chosen. The
state ~a must be transformed into ~b via a sequence of moves of two types:
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1. An adjustment of ~x ∈ Hr,k changes xk to any value in {0, 1, . . . , r} other than xk−1. For
example, (1, 2, 3, 4) can be changed to (1, 2, 3, 0) or (1, 2, 3, 5), but not (1, 2, 3, 3).
2. An involution of ~x ∈ Hr,k finds the longest tail segment of ~x on which the values xk and xk−1
alternate, and swaps xk with xk−1 in that segment. For example, (1, 2, 3, 4) can be changed
to (1, 2, 4, 3), or (1, 2, 1, 2) to (2, 1, 2, 1).
We define the Hanoi game on H∗r,k in the same way, but with the added requirement that all states
involved should be proper Hanoi states. This means that involutions (or, in the case of k = 1,
adjustments) that would change x1 to 0 are forbidden.
The name “Hanoi game” is justified because its structure is similar to the structure of the classical
Tower of Hanoi puzzle. In fact, though we have no need to prove this, the Hanoi game on H∗3,k is
isomorphic to a Tower of Hanoi puzzle with k disks.
It is well-known that the k-disk Tower of Hanoi puzzle can be solved in 2k − 1 moves, moving a
stack of k disks from one peg to another. In [10], a stronger statement is shown: only 2k− 1 moves
are required to go from any initial state to any final state. A similar result holds for the Hanoi
game on Hr,k:
Lemma 3.1. The Hanoi game on Hr,k (or H∗r,k) can be solved in at most 2k − 1 moves for any
initial state ~a and final state ~b.
Proof. We induct on k to show the following stronger statement: for any initial state ~a and final
state ~b, a solution of length at most 2k − 1 exists for which any intermediate state ~x has x1 = a1
or x1 = b1. This auxiliary condition also means that if ~a,~b ∈ H∗r,k, all intermediate states will also
stay in H∗r,k.
When k = 1, a single adjustment suffices to change ~a to ~b, which satisfies the auxiliary condition.
For k > 1, there are two possibilities when changing ~a to ~b:
• If a1 = b1, then consider the Hanoi game on Hr,k−1 with initial state (a2, a3, . . . , ak) and final
state (b2, b3, . . . , bk). By the inductive hypothesis, a solution using at most 2
k−1 − 1 moves
exists.
Apply the same sequence of adjustments and involutions in Hr,k to the initial state ~a. This
has the effect of changing the last k− 1 entries of ~a to (b2, b3, . . . , bk). To check that we have
obtained ~b, we need to verify that the first entry is left unchanged.
The auxiliary condition of the inductive hypothesis tells us that all intermediate states have
x2 = a2 or x2 = b2. Any move that leaves x2 unchanged also leaves x1 unchanged. A move
that changes x2 must be an involution swapping the values a2 and b2; however, x1 = a1 6= a2,
and x1 = b1 6= b2, so such an involution also leaves x1 unchanged.
Finally, the new auxiliary condition is satisfied, since we have x1 = a1 = b1 for all intermediate
states.
• If a1 6= b1, begin by taking 2k−1 − 1 moves to change ~a to (a1, b1, a1, b1, . . . ) while satisfying
the auxiliary condition, as in the first case.
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An involution takes this state to (b1, a1, b1, a1, . . . ); this continues to satisfy the auxiliary
condition.
Finally, 2k−1 − 1 more moves change this state to ~b, as in the first case, for a total of 2k − 1
moves.
If we obtain the same results as in the standard Tower of Hanoi puzzle, why use the more com-
plicated game in the first place? The reason is that in the classical problem, we cannot guarantee
that any starting state would have a final state 2k − 1 moves away. With the rules we define, as
long as the parameters are chosen judiciously, each state ~a ∈ Hr,k is part of many pairs (~a,~b) for
which the Hanoi game requires 2k − 1 moves to solve.
The following lemma almost certainly does not characterize such pairs, but provides a simple
sufficient condition that is strong enough for our purposes.
Lemma 3.2. The Hanoi game on Hr,k (or H∗r,k) requires exactly 2k − 1 moves to solve if ~a and ~b
are chosen with disjoint support: that is, ai 6= bj for all i and j.
Proof. Since Lemma 3.1 proved an upper bound of 2k − 1 for all pairs (~a,~b), we only need to prove
a lower bound in this case.
Once again, we induct on k. When k = 1, a single move is necessary to change ~a to ~b if ~a 6= ~b,
verifying the base case.
Consider a pair ~a,~b ∈ Hr,k with disjoint support, for k > 1. Moreover, assume that ~a and ~b are
chosen so that, of all pairs with disjoint support, ~a and ~b require the least number of moves to
solve the Hanoi game. (Since we are proving a lower bound on the number of moves necessary, this
assumption is made without loss of generality.)
In a shortest path from ~a to ~b, every other move is an adjustment: if there were two consecutive
adjustments, the first adjustment could be skipped, and if there were two consecutive involutions,
they would cancel out and both could be omitted. Moreover, the first move is an adjustment: if we
began with an involution, then the involution of ~a would be a state closer to ~b yet still with disjoint
support to ~b, contrary to our initial assumption. By the same argument, the last move must be an
adjustment.
Given a state ~x ∈ Hr,k, let its abbreviation be ~x′ = (x1, x2, . . . , xk−1) ∈ Hr,k−1. An adjustment of ~x
has no effect on ~x′, since only xk is changed. If xk 6= xk−2, then an involution of ~x is an adjustment
of ~x′, changing its last entry xk−1 to xk. Finally, if xk = xk−2, then an involution of ~x is also an
involution of ~x′.
Therefore, if we take a shortest path from ~a to ~b, omit all adjustments, and then abbreviate all
states, we obtain a solution to the Hanoi game on Hr,k−1 that takes ~a′ to ~b′. By the inductive
hypothesis, this solution contains at least 2k−1 − 1 moves, since ~a′ and ~b′ have disjoint support.
Therefore the shortest path from ~a to ~b contains at least 2k−1 − 1 involutions. Since the first, last,
and every other move is an adjustment, there must be 2k−1 adjustments as well, for a total of 2k−1
moves.
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Now let the Hanoi graph G∗r,k be the graph with vertex set H∗r,k and edges joining each state to all
the states that can be obtained from it by a single move. Since an adjustment can be reversed by
another adjustment, and an involution is its own inverse, G∗r,k is an undirected graph.
For any state ~a ∈ H∗r,k, there are at least (r − k)k other states with disjoint support to ~a, out of
|H∗r,k| = rk other states, forming a
(
1− kr
)k
> 1 − k2r fraction of all the states. By Lemma 3.2,
each such state ~b is at distance 2k − 1 from ~a in the graph G∗r,k, so G∗r,k is -distance uniform with
 = k
2
r , n = r
k vertices, and critical distance d = 2k − 1.
Having established the graph-theoretic properties of G∗r,k, we now prove Theorem 1.2 by analyzing
the asymptotic relationship between these parameters.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Begin by assuming that n = 22
m
for some m. Choose a and b such that
a+ b = m and
22b
22a
≤  < 2
2(b+1)
22a−1
,
which is certainly possible since 2
0
22m
= 1n ≤  and 2
2m
220
> 1 ≥ . Setting r = 22a and k = 2b, the
Hanoi graph G∗r,k has n vertices and is -distance uniform, since
k2
r ≤ . Moreover, our choice of
a and b guarantees that  < 4k
2√
r
, or log −1 ≥ 12 log r − 2 log 2k. Since n = rk, log n = k log r, so
log −1 ≥ 1
2k
log n− 2 log 2k.
We show that k ≥ logn
6 log −1 . Since  ≤ 1logn , this is automatically true if k ≥ logn6 log logn , so assume
that k < logn6 log logn . Then
1
3k
log n > 2 log log n > 2 log 2k,
so
log −1 ≥ 1
2k
log n− 2 log 2k > 1
2k
log n− 1
3k
log n =
1
6k
log n,
which gives us the desired inequality k ≥ logn
6 log −1 . The Hanoi graph G
∗
r,k has critical distance
d = 2k − 1 = 2Ω(
logn
log −1 ), so the proof is finished in the case that n has the form 22
m
for some n.
For a general n, we can choose m such that 22
m ≤ n < 22m+1 = (22m)2, which means in particular
that 22
m ≥ √n. If  < 2√
n
, then the requirement of a critical distance of 2
Ω( logn
log −1 ) is only a constant
lower bound, and we may take the graph Kn. Otherwise, by the preceding argument, there is a

2 -distance-uniform Hanoi graph with 2
2m vertices; its critical distance d satisfies
d ≥ 2Ω
(
log
√
n
log(/2)−1
)
= 2
Ω
(
logn
log −1
)
.
To extend this to an n-vertex graph, take the blow-up of the 22
m
-vertex Hanoi graph, replacing
every vertex by either bn/22mc or dn/22me copies.
Whenever v and w were at distance d in the original graph, the copies of v and w will be at distance
d in the blow-up. The difference between floor and ceiling may slightly ruin distance uniformity, but
9
the graph started out 2 -distance-uniform, and dn/22
me differs from bn/22mc at most by a factor of
2. Even in the worst case, where for some vertex v the 2 -fraction of vertices not at distance d from v
all receive the larger number of copies, the resulting n-vertex graph will be -distance-uniform.
3.2 Points on a sphere
In this section, we identify Gr,k, the graph of the Hanoi game on Hr,k, with a graph that arises
from a geometric construction.
Fix a dimension r. We begin by placing r + 1 points on the r-dimensional unit sphere arbitrarily
in general position (though, for the sake of symmetry, we may place them at the vertices of an
equilateral r-simplex). We identify these points with a graph by taking the 1-skeleton of their
convex hull. In this starting configuration, we simply get Kr+1.
Next, we define a truncation operation on a set of points on the r-sphere. Let δ > 0 be sufficiently
small that a sphere of radius 1 − δ, concentric with the unit sphere, intersects each edge of the
1-skeleton in two points. The set of these intersection points is the new arrangement of points
obtained by the truncation; they all lie on the smaller sphere, and for convenience, we may scale
them so that they are once again on the unit sphere. An example of this is shown in Figure 1.
0
1
2
3
(a) A tetrahedron
01
02
03
10
12
13
20
21
23
30
31
32
(b) A truncated tetrahedron
Figure 1: An example of truncation
Proposition 3.1. Starting with a set of r + 1 points on the r-dimensional sphere and applying k
truncations produces a set of points such that the 1-skeleton of their convex hull is isomorphic to
the graph Gr,k.
Proof. We induct on k. When k = 1, the graph we get is Kr+1, which is isomorphic to Gr,1.
From the geometric side, we add an auxiliary statement to the induction hypothesis: given points
p, q1, q2 such that, in the associated graph, p is adjacent to both q1 and q2, there is a 2-dimensional
face of the convex hull containing all three points. This is easily verified for k = 1.
Assuming that the induction hypotheses are true for k − 1, fix an isomorphism of Gr,k−1 with the
set of points after k−1 truncations, and label the points with the corresponding vertices of Gr,k−1.
We claim that the graph produced after one more truncation has the following structure:
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1. A vertex that we may label (~x, ~y) for every ordered pair of adjacent vertices of Gr,k−1.
2. An edge between (~x, ~y) and (~y, ~x).
3. An edge between (~x, ~y) and (~x, ~z) whenever both are vertices of the new graph.
The first claim is immediate from the definition of truncation: we obtain two vertices from the edge
between ~x and ~y. We choose to give the name (~x, ~y) to the vertex closer to ~x. The edge between ~x
and ~y remains an edge, and now joins the vertices (~x, ~y) and (~y, ~x), verifying the second claim.
By the auxiliary condition of the induction hypothesis, the vertices labeled ~x, ~y, and ~z lie on a
common 2-face whenever ~x is adjacent to both ~y and ~z. After truncation, (~x, ~y) and (~x, ~z) will also
be on this 2-face; since they are adjacent along the boundary of that face, and extreme points of
the convex hull, they are joined by an edge, verifying the third claim.
To finish the geometric part of the proof, we verify that the auxiliary condition remains true. There
are two cases to check. For a vertex labeled (~x, ~y), if we choose the neighbors (~x, ~z) and (~x, ~w), then
any two of them are joined by an edge, and therefore they must lie on a common 2-dimensional face.
If we choose the neighbors (~x, ~z) and (~y, ~x), then the points continue to lie on the 2-dimensional
face inherited from the face through ~x, ~y, and ~z of the previous convex hull.
Now it remains to construct an isomorphism between the 1-skeleton graph of the truncation, which
we will call T , and Gr,k. We identify the vertex (~x, ~y) of T with the vertex (x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, yk−1)
of Gr,k. Since xk−1 6= yk−1 after any move in the Hanoi game, this k-tuple really is a Hanoi state.
Conversely, any Hanoi state ~z ∈ Hr,k corresponds to a vertex of T : let ~x = (z1, z2, . . . , zk−1), and
let ~y be the state obtained from ~x by either an adjustment of zk−1 to zk, if zk 6= zk−2, or else an
involution, if zk = zk−2. Therefore the map we define is a bijection between the vertex sets.
Both T and Gr,k are r-regular graphs, therefore it suffices to show that each edge of T corresponds
so an edge in Gr,k. Consider an edge joining (~x, ~y) with (~x, ~z) in T . This corresponds to vertices
(x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, yk−1) and (x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, zk−1) in Gr,k; these are adjacent, since we can obtain
one from the other by an adjustment.
Next, consider an edge joining (~x, ~y) to (~y, ~x). If ~x and ~y are related by an adjustment in Gr,k−1,
then they have the form (x1, . . . , xk−2, xk−1) and (x1, . . . , xk−2, yk−1). The vertices corresponding
to (~x, ~y) and (~y, ~x) in Gr,k are (x1, . . . , xk−2, xk−1, yk−1) and (x1, . . . , xk−2, yk−1, xk−1), and one can
be obtained from the other by an involution.
Finally, if ~x and ~y are related by an involution in Gr,k−1, then that involution swaps xk−1 and yk−1.
Therefore such an involution in Gr,k will take (x1, . . . , xk−1, yk−1) to (y1, . . . , yk−1, xk−1), and the
vertices corresponding to (~x, ~y) and (~y, ~x) are adjacent in Gr,k.
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